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Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified
Immunity
DianaHassel*
I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the modem civil rights era,' a silent struggle has been waged
over civil liability for the violation of constitutional rights. The issues struggled
with are what kinds of constitutional wrongs should be compensated and out of
whose purse the damages should come. The mechanism for resolution of these
issues has largely been the application of immunity defenses to civil rights
remedies. A system of immunity defenses has been overlaid on the broad
remedy provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter "Section 1983Y').2 A
determination of the scope of the immunity defense-which government
officials should get it and how much-has provided the means to resolve, at least
temporarily, difficult questions regarding the proper role of civil damage awards
in protecting constitutional rights. The problem with this approach is that using
the immunity defense as the language of the debate over the proper limits of civil
rights remedies obscures choices that are being made on the fundamental and
divisive issue of what constitutional wrongs should be compensated.
This Article explores how and why immunity defenses, particularly
qualified immunity, have developed as camouflage for civil rights policy
decisions. I first set forth, in Part II, the judicial origins and stated rationale for
the current qualified immunity defense.
In Part 11I, Ianalyze the internal structure of the qualified immunity defense
both as a type of legal directive and as applied in current litigation. By looking
at the application of qualified immunity in recent cases, both the standard-like
way in which the doctrine operates and the policy choices that underlie its
application emerge. That some kinds of constitutional claims are more likely to
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Colloquium for the opportunity to discuss and refme the issues raised in this Article.
1. Modem civil rights litigation began in 1961 with the reviving of 42 U.S.C. §

1983 (1994 & Supp. 111996) in Monroe v. Pape,365 U.S. 167, 170-71 (1961). Monroe
launched the beginning of a broad application of Section 1983 to state and local officials.
2. Generally, Section 1983 provides for money damages for the violation by a state

or local official of any right "secured by the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 &
Supp. 111996). A similarly broad remedy is available against federal officials based on
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents ofthe FederalBureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388,

395-96 (1971).
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result in a successful use of the qualified immunity defense than others
illuminates the way qualified immunity provides cover for policy choices. The
broad qualified immunity standard allows for a determination concerning
liability of the defendant that is very flexible and almost completely subject to
the policy beliefs of the judge making the decision. By applying the qualified
immunity standard, the court will, in essence, determine whether it is just for a
particular defendant to pay damages and whether a particular plaintiff should be
compensated for a particular constitutional wrong. Rather than address the
appropriateness of compensating a category of wrong or protecting a category
of governmental behavior, the decision will be articulated in immunityspeak-was the constitutional right allegedly violated clearly established at the
time of the particular defendant's action and should that right have reasonably
been known to this particular defendant. The hard question of whether, for
example, a suspect who is wrongfully detained in a large drug sweep should
receive monetary compensation from a Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agent who was relying on incorrect information will not be addressed.
Rather, the issue before the court will be whether the defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity. This way of resolving the issue of whether liability will be
imposed is very effective in obscuring the policy decisions being made about the
limits of liability. Only by piecing together many qualified immunity decisions
is it possible to determine the pattern of likely results. The fact that certain kinds
of constitutional wrongs will almost never subject a defendant to liability is not
directly stated. Instead, the decisions articulate a particularized decision
regarding a defendant's entitlement to immunity.
In Part IV, I explore both the usefulness of a doctrine such as qualified
immunity that allows substantive choices to be made silently and the costs
inherent in such a doctrine. While the qualified immunity defense arguably
encourages quiescence by letting steam out of what might otherwise be a
divisive area of public debate, we pay a high cost for its sedative effect. The
defense encourages us to pretend that we have an even-handed way to address
a wide range of civil rights violations. In fact, we do not. That no such system
for redress is in place is, in perhaps some unarticulated way, known to the
participants and onlookers in the civil rights drama. However, qualified
immunity makes it possible to avoid the necessity of directly facing the question
of which kinds of constitutional wrongs, if any, should be redressed by damage
awards.
I conclude that the qualified immunity doctrine's usefulness is outweighed
by the cost paid in the coherent development of civil rights law. Decisions
concerning the direction of civil rights liability are being made but are not being
acknowledged as such. Rather than continue this charade, the development of
civil rights law would be better served by a more open judicial or legislative
discussion of the policy choices that must be made. While there may be no
immediate consensus on these choices, the formulation of the debate around the
real issues, rather than the arcane requirements of the qualified immunity
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/9
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defense, will at least provide a language with which to have the needed policy
debate.
II. JUDICIAL CREATION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

In 1871, Congress created a civil remedy for the violation of constitutional
rights pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 That remedy, now
known as Section 1983, 4 was passed as part of the Ku Klux Klan Acte and was
enacted in response to violence against newly freed slaves and the inability or
unwillingness of state officials to control the lawlessness that existed at that
time.6 The statute placed the federal government in the role of "guarantor of
basic federal rights against state power" and was meant to "protect people from
unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that action be
executive, legislative, or judicial."' 7 The plain language of Section 1983
appears to contemplate a broad remedy, providing that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State or Territory... subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
8
proceeding for redress ....
On its face, the statute provides for no immunities from liability. Nonetheless,
ina series of decisions beginning in 1967 with Pierson v. Ray, the United States
Supreme Court created immunity defenses.9 In a policy-driven analysis which
3. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 111996)).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
5. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 111996)).
6. See PETER H. SCHUCK,
WRONGS 47 (1983).

SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL

7. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex ParteVirginia,
100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
9. 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). Prior to Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
Section 1983 was largely unused as a method of enforcement of individual rights. Prior
to Monroe, the statute was interpreted to apply only to a narrow range of state action.
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (limiting the scope of the Civil Rights Act to
actions taken pursuant to state law or authority). In Monroe, the state action necessary
to trigger the application of Section 1983 was expanded to include actions of state
officials which were contrary to state law. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183. Since 1967 the
number of cases brought pursuant to Section 1983 has expanded from 153 in 1967 to
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was largely uninfluenced by any controlling law, the Court fashioned the
qualified immunity defense. As it evolved, the stated purpose of the defense
was to protect government officials who acted reasonably from frivolous law
suits but also to provide damages for plaintiffs when a government official's
conduct was particularly blameworthy. However, these stated rationales for the
qualified immunity defense do not tell the whole story. The qualified immunity
defense also provided a flexible mechanism for the resolution of civil rights
actions that would leave the determination of the outcome almost entirely in the
unfettered control of the courts.
The creation of the immunity defense began when the United States
Supreme Court read Section 1983 as incorporating common law immunities that
were in place in 1871, the time of Section 1983's original passage.'0 In Pierson
v. Ray, Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for the majority, concluded that a

policeman in Mississippi sued under Section 1983 would be entitled to
immunity from liability if he arrested civil rights workers under state law that
was later found to be unconstitutional but that was valid at the time of the act."
He concluded that "[t]he legislative record gives, no clear indication that
Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunity" when it
enacted Section 1983.2 In addition to finding a nineteenth century common law
basis for a good faith defense for police officers that was arguably incorporated
in Section 1983, the Court's conclusion was also based on an assessment that
sound policy supported such a defense. As Chief Justice Warren stated, "A
policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged
with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he had probable cause, and
being mulcted in damages if he does."' 3 Thus, the roadmap for determining
whether immunity defenses applied to Section 1983 actions was developed.
Questions that had to be addressed were, first, whether the defense arguably
existed in nineteenth century common law; second, whether there was a
congressional intent to deviate from that immunity; and third, whether
application of14the defense was consistent with the policy underlying the civil
rights statute.

Taking an activist stance, the Court was not content to read Section 1983
on its face as providing no immunities or to leave the question to Congress
whether to provide appropriate defenses by amendment of Section 1983.
Instead, the Court imposed its vision of what it believed must be the limitations

approximately 10,000 in 1986. SHELDON H. NAHMOD

ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

3 (1995).
10. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-54.
11. Id. at 557.
12. Id. at 554. In 1871, police officers were entitled under tort law to a defense of
good faith and probable cause. Id. at 556.

13. Id. at 555.
14. See id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/9

4

1999]

Hassel: Hassel: Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity
QUALIFIEDIMMUNITY DOCTRINE

on liability under Section 1983." This imposition of an immunity defense,
while ostensibly based at least in part on the state of the common law at the time
of the enactment of Section 1983 and the drafters' presumed intention to
incorporate these defenses, was largely based on the Court's sense that it would
be unfair to have individual government officials held personally liable when
they acted in good faith but were later determined to have violated constitutional
rights.
In the years that followed Pierson, the Court sorted through which
government officials were entitled to absolute immunity and which were
protected by good faith, or qualified immunity. Prosecutors, 6 judges, 7 members
of Congress,'8 and the President 9 were entitled to absolute immunity from
liability for the violation of constitutional rights. Absolute immunity for these
officials was necessary to protect the functioning of central governmental
systems. Judges and prosecutors must not be subject to the burden of civil

rights actions to protect the trial process.2" Members of the legislature must not

15. In his dissent in Pierson, Justice Douglas disagreed with the premise that the
drafters of Section 1983 must have meant to incorporate then existing common law
immunities.' Id. v.t 561 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He argued that Congress would have
made its intention to incorporate the common law into Section 1983 clear if it had that
intention. Id. at 560-6 1.
16. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). To determine that prosecutors were
entitled to absolute immunity, the Court looked to the common law: "1983 is to be read
in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in
derogation of them." Id. at 418. The conclusion that absolute immunity was necessary
was also based on the belief that the policy of"protect[ing] the decision-making process
in which the official is engaged" was a sound one. Id. at 435. See also Kalina v.
Fletcher, 118 S. Ct. 502, 510 (1997) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune if
"performing traditional functions of an advocate").
17. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,554-55 (1967) ("The immunity ofjudges for acts
within the judicial role is ...well established, and we presume that Congress would have
specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.").
18. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge
his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that
he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected
from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise
of that liberty may occasion offense.
Id. at 373. Members of Congress are also protected by the Speech and Debate Clause of
the Constitution. Id. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.

19. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (stating the absolute immunity
from damages liability is "a functionally mandated incident of the President's unique
office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by
our history "). "[O]ur immunity decisions have been informed by the common law....
This Court necessarily also has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as
illuminated by our history and the structure of our government." Id. at 747-48.
20. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418, 427. Police officers when testifying in criminal trials
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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be subject to liability in order to allow them to freely exercise their legislative
responsibilities.2 The gravity of the responsibilities of the President require that
he or she be free from the distraction of liability for civil rights claims.22 The
decision to insulate certain government officials from liability was driven by the
Court's determination that critical governmental functions must remain
unfettered so as to provide better government for all. These decisions were to
a large extent unabashedly based on the policy choices of the Court.
Having carved out absolute immunity for some categories of government
officials, the Court also refined the good faith defense first articulated in
Pierson. The standard for qualified immunity as it began in Pierson was
described as the "defense of good faith and probable cause" that protected
police officers who took actions which, in good faith, they believed to be
constitutional. 23 The Court reached this conclusion by looking to the
"background of tort liability." 4 Since tort law provided a good faith defense
for police officers who made an arrest that was later determined to be unlawful,
that defense was incorporated into Section 1983.25 Thus, at the early stages of
the development of the qualified immunity defense, the Court bound itself quite
closely to existing common law tort defenses.26
After Pierson,the good faith defense was expanded beyond a protection
for police officers. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Court declared that the qualified

are also entitled to absolute immunity. Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1983).

21. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373.
22. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 752. Interestingly, although they occupy the same
functional position in state government, governors do not enjoy absolute immunity.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974).

23. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). The Court applied this defense to
a Section 1983 action because it was the common law defense available to the torts of
false arrest and imprisonment. Id.
24. Id. at 556-57.
25. Id.

26. The Court did not feel so bound to the common law when it considered the
immunity of municipalities. The Court determined that in enacting Section 1983,
Congress necessarily meant to abrogate sovereign immunity for a municipality's
governmental actions. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 647 (1980); see
also Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This waiver of
sovereign immunity took place even though such immunity was firmly established at the
time of enactment and even though Section 1983 does not explicitly state that such a
waiver of immunity was intended. That the Court was much less deferential to the
surrounding common law when it dealt with the issue of municipal liability, as opposed

to its treatment of immunities available to individuals, is another indication that the
Court's deference to common law principles in the area of individual liability was largely

policy driven. While the Court explained in Owen that municipalities were not protected
by sovereign immunity for their governmental actions, they nonetheless were denied the
defense of qualified immunity. Owen, 445 U.S. at 650.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/9
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immunity defense was generally available to all officers of the executive branch
of government based on
all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the
action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of
reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all
the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis
for qualified immunity of executive
officers for acts performed in the
27
course of official conduct.

Shortly thereafter, in Wood v. Strickland, the Court extended qualified
immunity to school board members.28 The Strickland court described the
immunity standard as allowing for liability only if the school board member
"knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his
sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the
student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause
a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student." 29 The
application of the qualified immunity defense thus depended on both objective
and subjective factors: what the official reasonably knew at the time of his
action; whether the official had a good faith belief that he was acting in
accordance with constitutional requirements; and whether the official intended
to do "other injury" to the student. All of these elements had to be examined
before the immunity could be successfully invoked.
The creation of the qualified immunity defense was based on an explicit
balancing of interests. On the one hand, providing absolute immunity to all
government officials would eliminate the possibility of recovery for a wide

range of claims and would, in large part, eviscerate Section 1983.30 On the
other hand, providing no defense would unfairly subject government officials
to punishment when they were carrying out their jobs in good faith.3 The Court
also feared that providing no immunity would result in harm to society at large
because government officials would be reluctant to act and thus would not

27. 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974). Scheuer concerned claims brought by university

students based on the actions of the Ohio National Guard during disturbances at Kent
State University. The plaintiff brought claims against the Governor, other state officials
and members of the national guard. The Court determined that the claims against the
officials were not barred by executive or absolute immunity. Id. at 235.
28. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).

29. Id. at 322.
30. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 243, 248. In part because of its concern that
expanding immunity would eliminate the possibility of recovery for a civil rights
violation, the Court determined in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651

(1980), that municipalities could not invoke an immunity defense.
31. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 245.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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vigorously fulfill their obligations.3 2 The pull of these conflicting interests led
to modifications of the qualified immunity defense. Most often the perceived
need to protect government officials was the driving force behind the alterations
made to the defense.
In the early development of the defense, there were both objective and
subjective components to the qualified immunity standard. Protection would be
denied if the government official "knew or reasonably should have known that
the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate []
constitutional rights" or if the official "took the action with the malicious
'
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury."33
Thus,
two qualities had to be present to successfully invoke the qualified immunity
defense-a reasonable understanding of the law and a pure, or at least not
malicious, heart.
Application of the subjective component of the defense was often
dependent on the resolution of factual disputes. The plaintiff would raise the
factual issue of whether the defendant maliciously took the allegedly
unconstitutional action. Because of this dispute concerning the defendant's
intent, it was difficult for a defendant to have a claim dismissed based on
qualified immunity prior to trial. This delay in the resolution of the lawsuit was
perceived to be unfair to defendants as it embroiled them in potentially meritless
and lengthy litigation.34 In response, the Court eliminated the subjective
requirement of good faith from the qualified immunity defense in Harlow v.
Fitzgerald.35 The rationale for eliminating that element of the defense was to
protect government officials from frivolous law suits. "[Blare allegations of
malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of
'
trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery."36
The newly articulated
qualified immunity test provided that "government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages

32. Id. at 241 ("[T]he public interest requires decisions and action to enforce laws
for the protection of the public.... [I]t is better to risk some error and possible injury
from such error than not to decide to act at all."). In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
517 (1978) (Rhenquist, J. dissenting), Justice Rhenquist in his dissenting opinion argued
that protecting the freedom of action of high level executive officials required that such
officials receive not just qualified, but absolute immunity. Justice Rhenquist believed
that the application of the qualified immunity defense to all executive officials would
lead to "a significant impairment of the ability of responsible public officials to carry out
the duties imposed upon them by law." Id. at 530.
33. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975). O'Connor set the scope
of immunity available to hospital officials. See also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S.
555, 562, 566 (1978).
34. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1982).
35. Id. at 815.
36. Id. at 817-18. Harlow also provided that discovery should be limited until the
initial issue of qualified immunity is resolved. Id. at 18.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/9
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insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."37
This objective qualified immunity defense-liability only if an official
violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known-was said by the Court in Harlow to represent the proper
balance between conflicting interests.38 Those conflicting interests included the
following: the need to provide the compensation for violation of constitutional
rights that Section 1983 requires; the need to deter unconstitutional behavior;
the need to vindicate constitutional rights; the need to protect innocent
defendants from frivolous claims; and the need to encourage vigorous
enforcement of the law.39 The qualified immunity defense, as articulated in
Harlow,based on a balancing of interests, has remained essentially intact to the
present.
In cases following Harlow, the qualified immunity defense increasingly
came to provide not only immunity from liability, but also protection from the
necessity of standing trial.40 In order to ensure that defendants were not
enmeshed in litigation if they were entitled to qualified immunity, Mitchell v.
Forsyth established the immediate appealability of a pretrial denial of qualified
immunity.l Thus, qualified immunity came to resemble absolute immunity in
the scope of protection it provided defendants.42 While not providing the
complete defense that absolute immunity does, the goal was to as quickly as
possible remove from the government official the necessity of participation in
the lawsuit. The defense was broad enough to "provide[] ample protection to
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." 43 And
its procedural protections were meant to avoid even the necessity of
participation in lengthy litigation by most defendants.
As the contours of the objective qualified immunity defense evolved, it
became clear that qualified immunity was a completely new species of defense,
quite unfettered from the tort origins that were the original basis of thejudicially

37. Id.
38. Id. at 813. "The resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance

between the evils inevitable in any available alternative." Id. at 813-14.
39. David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court:
JudicialActivism and the Restriction of ConstitutionalRights, 138 U. PENN. L. REv. 23,
73 (1989). Rudovsky argues that the interest in ensuring effective law enforcement has
become the dominant interest served in the qualified immunity defense. Id. at 36.
40. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511,524 (1985).
41. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524. See also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299,310-11
(1996) (permitting two interlocutory appeals on denial of qualified immunity); cf
Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800, 1806 (1997) (holding no federal right to
interlocutory appeal on denial of qualified immunity in state court).
42. See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232.
43. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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created defense. In Wyatt v. Cole, the Court explained that the qualified
immunity defense was quite distinct from the original "good faith and probable
cause" defense first articulated in Pierson.44 The qualified immunity defense
was now a "wholly objective standard" that provided an "immunity from suit

rather than a mere defense to liability., 4' This type of defense is based "on
principles not at all embodied in the common law."4'6 The origins and
justification for the qualified immunity defense, i.e., that Congress in 1871 must
have meant to incorporate existing common law defenses into Section 1983, had
been replaced by a new policy-based rationale for the defense.4 7 The defense
is meant to "strike a balance between compensating those who have been
injured by official conduct and protecting government's ability to perform its
traditional functions. 48
Over a thirty year period, the Court fashioned a defense which was
justified by its balance of the competing interests of the plaintiff, the defendant,
and the public at large in its interest in efficient and vigorous government.4 9 The
Court maintained that because qualified immunity allows for the possibility that
some plaintiffs will be compensated for violations of constitutional rights, the
defense does not subvert the remedy provided by Section 1983.50 A defendant
who acts in defiance of clearly established constitutional law of which a

44. 504 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1992).
45. Id. at 166 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
46. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987). The adoption of a qualified
immunity defense that goes beyond that available under common law is discussed
extensively by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Wyatt. He suggests that the
divergence from the common law in Harlow was motivated primarily by the difficulty
under then current summary judgment law of resolving an intent issue without
conducting a trial. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 171 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy
cautions that since the Court is interpreting a remedial statute it does not have the
freedom of action of a court interpreting common law and that "we may not transform
what existed at common law based on our notions ofpolicy or efficiency." Id. at 171-72.
47. See Stephen J. Shapiro, Public Official's QualifiedImmunity in Section 1983
Actions UnderHarlow v. Fitzgerald And Its Progeny: A CriticalAnalysis, 22 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 249,266-67 (1989).
48. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167. Wyatt determined that because of the peculiarly

governmental interests served by qualified immunity, it was not applicable to nongovernmental defendants. Id. at 167-68. A private defendant may be entitled, however,
to a good faith and probable cause defense. Id. at 169. See also Richardson v.
McKnight 117 S.Ct. 2100, 2108 (1997) (holding employees of a private prison not
entitled to qualified immunity). Thus, while a private defendant may be able to assert the
pre-Harlow type good faith defense, governmental defendants were entitled to a much
more sweeping and effective defense.
49. Interestingly, the public's general interest in a government that does not violate
the civil rights of its citizens is not listed by the Court of one of the goals meant to be
served by qualified immunity.
50. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1982).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/9
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reasonable person should have known will be found liable under Section 1983."
Deterrence from unlawful activity by government officials is supposedly
provided by this possibility of individual liability.
On the other side of the equation, the qualified immunity defense is meant
to protect innocent defendants from frivolous claims. The Court maintained that
because the qualified immunity defense is an objective one, it can be resolved
at the outset of a lawsuit without extensive discovery. 2 Therefore, the aim is
that frivolous lawsuits will be ended quickly without involving a defendant in
protracted litigation.5 3 Similarly, because only the "truly culpable," those who
violate clearly established law, will be found liable, government officials will
not be reluctant to vigorously exercise their official responsibilities, and the
public will be served by bold and effective government. As described by the
Court, the qualified immunity defense thus appears to balance competing
interests; to punish only the truly guilty, not just the hapless; to provide a

remedy to the worthy plaintiff; to protect the judicial system from being
logiammed with frivolous claims; and to promote good government. Qualified
immunity seemingly tempers what would otherwise be a broad and unwieldy
right to compensation.
These laudable goals notwithstanding, the judicial creation and
modification of the qualified immunity defense gave the courts broad discretion
to determine whether a particular civil rights claim would go forward. Whether
certain types of claims would result in judgments for plaintiffs or summary
judgments for defendants was now firmly in the control of the judiciary. This
placement of control in the hands of the courts through the mechanism of
qualified immunity has led to the development of a canon of civil rights law that

51. The qualified immunity defense also applies to civil rights actions brought
against federal officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau ofNarcotics,403 U.S. 388 (1971).

52. Harlow,457 U.S. at 818.
53. The Court recently revisited the question of what evidence must be adduced
by the plaintiff to defeat a motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified
immunity. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998). In Crawford-El,the
Court rejected a heightened burden of proof for opposing motions for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity that was developed by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. Id. at 1594. The District of Columbia Circuit had required that a
plaintiff produce clear and convincing evidence of improper motive to defeat a motion

for summary judgment. Id. at 1588. The Court made clear that when the intent of the
defendant is an element of the underlying constitutional claim, there should be no

heightened burden of proof required for the plaintiff to establish his claim. Id. at 159394. This means that with respect to some constitutional claims, discovery concerning the
defendant's state of mind may be necessary before the issue of qualified immunity can
be resolved. For a further discussion of heightened pleading requirements, see Cory T.
Way, In Defense ofExecutive Branch Defendants: The CaseforHeightened Protection
Requirements in Actions for DamagesAgainst Public Servants, 83 VA. L. REv. 1225

(1997).
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is apparently driven by a focus on the reasonableness of the defendant. This
emphasis on the defendant removes the spotlight from the impact of civil rights
law on the plaintiff and on broader societal concerns about the enforcement of
civil rights.
III. THE APPLICATION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

A close look at the way in which the qualified imnunity defense operates
reveals that the primary value of the defense is the process it supplies for the
resolution of civil rights claims. Since there seems to be almost universal
discontent with some aspects of the substantive outcome when qualified
immunity is applied, it is clear that the tenacity of the defense is based on the
method of resolving civil rights claims that it provides, rather than on general
agreement with the justice of the outcome of those claims. Qualified immunity
makes the result of each civil rights claim appear to be based on the particular
facts of each case, rather than based on the appropriateness of providing relief
for a violation of the constitutional right in question. Perhaps the greatest
appeal of the qualified immunity defense is that it seemingly provides for varied
results. This flexibility allows the defense to be perceived as having
contradictory qualities. It has been described as both unfair to plaintiffs and
defendants and as beneficial to plaintiffs and defendants, as well as either a
boon to societal interests or a hindrance to the furtherance of those interests.
And while the defense may at some level displease all players in the civil rights
litigation arena, it provides a seemingly fair mechanism to resolve a highly
charged conflict between the rights of a plaintiff and the legitimate need for
protection of the defendant. The problem with this method of resolving civil
rights disputes is the high cost in clarity and coherence we pay for using it.
A. QualifiedImmunity as a Legal Standard
To understand the impact of a legal directive's form on the outcome of
disputes and on the process of dispute resolution, legal scholars have contrasted
the categories of rule and standard as the two poles used to express legal
directives. 4 Duncan Kennedy describes a rule as a legal directive that "requires
[the judge] to respond to the presence together of each of a list of easily
distinguishable factual aspects of a situation by intervening in a determinate
way."'55 In contrast, a standard is a legal directive that "requires the judge both
to discover the facts of a particular situation and to assess them in terms of the

54. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89
HARV L. REv. 1685, 1687-88 (1976); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22, 57-58 (1992).
55. Kennedy, supra note 54, at 1687-88.
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purposes or social values embodied in the standard."56 The qualified immunity
defense is a standard and thus shares the qualities of other legal standards.
The same policy can be promoted by either a standard or a rule. For
example, the directive that no one under the age of twenty-one may drink

alcohol is a rule.57 A standard aimed at accomplishing roughly the same
purpose would be: no on may drink who is not mature enough to understand
the risks inherent in the consumption of alcohol. While both directives may aim
to accomplish similar goals, substantive consequences flow from the form in
which a legal directive is placed. Rules are thought to create more certainty;
there is little ambiguity about how a rule applies to a particular fact situation. 8
At the same time, rules can be unjust because they are under or over inclusive. 9
Rules punish some behavior which is not inconsistent with the goal of the
directive and allow other behavior to go unfettered which, given the goal of the
directive, ought to be corrected. For example, if the goal of the legal directive
is to prevent the immature from drinking alcohol, an age limit is both under and
over inclusive. An age limit does not prevent those over twenty-one whose
judgment is not sound from drinking; others who are under twenty-one and
quite capable of handling the decision of whether to drink are prevented from
drinking. Thus, a rule may prevent both more and less than would be ideal.
If a legal directive is in the form of a standard, there is much less certainty
in the outcome. Casting a legal directive in the form of a standard allows the

56. Kennedy, supra note 54, at 1688.
57. That the drinking age prohibition is an archetypal rule seems to be a widely
held belief, see Margaret Jane Ridin, Reconsideringthe Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV.
781, 795-96 (1989), rivaled only by the example of the speed limit. See Alan K. Chen,
The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of ConstitutionalBalancing
Tests, 81 IOWA L. REv. 261,282 (1995).
58. Some would argue that indeterminacy is not limited to standards and that any
attempt to determine a legal right based on the balancing of interests "produce[s] no
determinate results." Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1363, 1372
(1984). However, notwithstanding this general critique concerning the indeterminacy of
legal rules, different levels of certainty can be obtained by use of different directives.
59. Kennedy writes:
The use of rules, as opposed to standards, to deter immoral or antisocial
conduct means that sometimes perfectly innocent behavior will be punished,
and that sometimes plainly guilty behavior will escape sanction. The cost of
mechanical over- and under-inclusion are the price of avoiding the potential
arbitrariness and uncertainty of a standard.
Kennedy, supra note 54, at 1695.
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maker relatively more discretion, while a rule allows for less.6"
a standard allows for more discretion, a legal decision in which a
was applied has less precedential value. The process of applying a
is one which

allow[s] the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or
the totality of the circumstances. Thus, the application of a standard
in one case ties the decisionmaker's hand in the next case less than
does a rule-the more facts one may take into account, the more
likely that some of them will be different the next time.6'
Thus, one of the reasons one might choose to embody a directive in the form of
a rule, in spite of the imprecision that will result, is to avoid uncertainty and
arbitrariness that may result from a relatively uncontrolled decision maker.
"Rules embody a distrust of the decisionnaker they seek to constrain."62
The adoption of a standard reflects a decision to place trust in the ability
of the decisionmaker to come to ajust conclusion with little binding guidance.
Standards allow for flexible application and for the development of the standard
as circumstances change.63 Standards place the responsibility for any given
outcome squarely in the hands of the decisionmaker, not in the rigid application
of a rule.' Thus, an unpopular decision made under a directive formed as a
standard will be blamed on the judge, while an unpopular decision made under
a rule will be attributed to the rule.
B. QualifiedImmunity StandardIn Action
To analyze the application of the qualified immunity standard as it is
currently being applied on the front lines of civil rights litigation, I reviewed
recent cases in which the defendant sought the protection of the qualified
immunity defense.65 The courts have taken the standard created by the United

60. Sullivan, supra note 54, at 57-58.
61. Sullivan, supra note 54, at 59. Professor Sullivan contrasts the constitutional
methodologies of rule-like categories and standard-like balancing. Sullivan, supra note
54, at 69-94.
62. Sullivan, supra note 54, at 64.
63. See Sullivan, supranote 54, at 66.
64. See Chen, supra note 57, at 263; Sullivan, supra note 54, at 69.
65. I have reviewed United States District Court and United States Court of
Appeals cases for the past two years as a basis of surveying the current application of
qualified immunity. Most of the determinations of whether qualified immunity will be
applied are made as a result of motions for summary judgment. The issue of qualified

immunity is first dealt with in the district court with defendant's motion for summary
judgment. If this motion is denied, it is reviewed de novo by the court of appeals.
Accordingly, my review attempted to gather summary judgment decisions rather than
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States Supreme Court and applied it to a broad range of situations. The standard
is applied in a several step process, each step requiring the court to make a factbased determination of whether the defense is appropriate. What emerges from
this analysis is that the process provides several points at which the court's
almost unfettered judgment determines the outcome of the application of the
defense. What also emerges is that the cases taken as a whole do establish
categorical results based on the underlying constitutional claim. That is, some
kinds of constitutional wrongs are more likely to result in compensation for the
plaintiff than others.
1. Qualified Immunity Granted
Focusing first on cases in which qualified immunity is granted, I have
outlined examples of typical reasoning used by courts in making their
determinations.
The threshold step in applying the qualified immunity defense is
determining whether the facts the plaintiff has asserted establish the violation
of a constitutional right. 6 The court addresses this question before moving on
to the more nuanced analysis of the remainder of the standard: "In analyzing
qualified immunity claims, we first ask if a plaintiff has asserted the violation

of a constitutional right at all, and then assess whether the right was clearly
established at the time of the defendant's actions. 67 In Barney v. Pulsipher,6

for example, the court considered whether the defendant's actions violated the
Eighth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause. If the plaintiff's claims do
not state a violation of the law, the court need not reach the issue of whether
clearly established law was violated. 9
The next step, which clearly allows the judge a great deal of latitude, is to
decide whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time the
alleged offense occurred. 70 This can be a subtle and complex question where

post trial decisions.
66. See, e.g., Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 1998); Mace
v. City of Akron, 989 F. Supp. 949, 960 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
67. Barney, 143 F.3d at 1309 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
68. 143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998).
69. The court determined that the sexual assault of an inmate by a prison guard was
not a violation of her Eight Amendment or Equal Protection rights. Id. at 1309-10.
70. See, e.g., Campbell v. Burt, 141 F.3d 927, 929 (9th Cir. 1998) (granting
qualified immunity where clearly established due process right not violated by state
social services worker); Greer v. Shoop, 141 F.3d. 824, 827 (8th Cir. 1998) (granting
qualified immunity where no clearly established due process right to warn girlfriend of
parolee's HIV status); Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1998) (granting
qualified immunity where no clearly established Fourth Amendment right violated by
police); Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d. 1378, 1384 (11th Cir. 1998) (granting
qualified immunity where no clearly established Fourth or First Amendment rights
violated by police); Rowe v. Schreiber, 139 F.3d 1381, 1384 (11th Cir. 1998) (granting
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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the project is to reconstruct the state of the law some years earlier and then
determine what it clearly established. In considering whether defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity when they allowed newspaper reporters and
photographers to be present during the execution of an arrest warrant within the
plaintiffs' house, the court in Wilson v. Layne described the clearly established
standard as one that
protects law enforcement officials from "bad guesses in gray areas"
and ensures that they are liable only "for transgressing bright lines."
Thus, although the exact conduct at issue need not have been held to
be unlawful in order for the law governing to be clearly established,
the existing authority must be such that the unlawfulness of the
conduct is manifest .... The law is clearly established such that an
officer's conduct transgresses a bright line when the law has been
authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court, the appropriate United
States Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state.7'
Analyzing the extant law at the time of the incident concerning the
photographing of police activities, the court maintained that because the United

qualified immunity where no clearly established Sixth Amendment right violated by
public defender); Sanchez v. Swyden, 139 F.3d 464, 468 (5th Cir. 1998) (granting
qualified immunity because no clearly established due process rights were violated in
detention of criminal suspect); Brown v. Ives, 129 F.3d 209, 212 (1st Cir. 1997)
(granting qualified immunity when labeling of plaintiff as "sex offender" did not violate
clearly established due process rights); Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 404
(2d Cir. 1997) (granting qualified immunity where no clearly established right violated
by social services agency in failure to facilitate communication between adoptive
siblings); Walker v. McClellan, 126 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 1997) (granting qualified
immunity where no clearly established due process right violated at prison disciplinary
hearing); Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1965 (1st Cir. 1997) (granting qualified
immunity where no clearly established due process right violated by failure to protect
children from abusive father); Brinson v. McKeeman, 992 F. Supp. 897, 909 (W.D. Tex
1997) (granting qualified immunity where failure to provide inmate with filing forms
does not violate clearly established First Amendment right); K.U. v. Alvin Indep. Sch.
Dist., 991 F. Supp. 599, 608 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (granting qualified immunity where no
clearly established equal protection or First Amendment right violated by school
officials); Price v. County of San Diego, 990 F. Supp. 1230, 1244 (S.D. Cal. 1998)
(granting qualified immunity where no clearly established Fourth Amendment right
violated by sheriff); Lynch v. City of Boston, 989 F. Supp. 275, 289 (D. Mass. 1997)
(granting qualified immunity where no clearly established First Amendment right
violated); McGrail & Rowley v. Babbit, 986 F. Supp. 1386, 1398 (S.D. Fl. 1997)
(granting qualified immunity where no clearly established right violated); Spencer v.
Lavoie, 986 F. Supp. 717, 721 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (granting qualified immunity where no
clearly established due process right violated by removal of children from parental
control).
71. Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/9
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States Supreme Court had held that "seizure occurs only when there has been
a meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in
property,"72 the photographs taken by the newspaper at the time of the attempted
execution of the warrant did not violate a clearly established Fourth Amendment
right. The court further determined that "there was no clear law from the
Supreme Court, this court, or the Court of Appeals of Maryland establishing that
permitting reporters to observe and photograph the events surrounding the
execution of an arrest warrant may not serve a legitimate law enforcement
purpose related to the execution of warrants."'73 In Wilson, the court did not
reach the issue of whether the actions alleged would have violated Fourth
Amendment rights, but only "whether the legal landscape when these events
occurred was sufficiently developed that it would have been obvious to
reasonable officers that the actions at issue were violative of the Fourth
Amendment."74
Surveying the same legal landscape, the dissent in Wilson determined that
the defendants' actions had violated clearly established law.7" The dissent
argued that the core values of the Fourth Amendment were clearly implicated
when the police officers allowed the newspaper reporters to view and
photograph the plaintiffs in their home, undressed, in a confrontation with the
police.76 In reaching this conclusion, the dissent relied upon general Fourth
Amendment principles concerning the limitations on the government's right to
intrude into the privacy of the home and general prohibitions against police
intrusions beyond the scope of those authorized by a warrant, which in this case
did not authorize the presence of reporters.77 In a strongly worded expression
of its concerns, the dissent concluded that "by holding the innocent occupants
of the home at gunpoint while members of the media photographed them in
their underwear... [t]he officers could hardly have done more violence to the
well-established Fourth Amendment principles recounted above."'
These two approaches to the same set of facts illustrate the ability of the
qualified immunity standard to result in widely different outcomes. The court
in Wilson looks for a specific, factually similar case from an authoritative court
as evidence that the right was clearly established. The dissent relies on general
legal principles that it believes ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the
conduct at issue violates a constitutional right. Both approaches can be
encompassed under the big tent of the clearly established standard, giving the
decisionmaker considerable range in fashioning an outcome. Depending on the

72. Id. at 115 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
73. Id. at 116.
74. Id. at 118.
75. Id. at 119 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 122 ("Today's majority opinion undermines the right at the very core of
the Fourth Amendment and sanctions an 'unreasonable governmental intrusion."').
77. Id. at 115.
78. Id. at 125 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting).
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decisionmaker's view of appropriate policy concerning, for example, the
autonomy that should be accorded the police or the role of the media in law
enforcement, what is "clearly" established may not be that clear.
In another approach to the clearly established element of the defense, the
court in Campbellv. Burt determined that even though the defendant knew that
his actions were unlawful, he nonetheless did not violate a clearly established
federal right.79 In Campbell, the defendant, an employee of Hawaii's Child
Protective Service, took emergency custody of plaintiff s child but failed to file
a petition for temporary custody until seven days later.8" State law required that
such a petition be filed -within two days. 8' The plaintiff claimed that the
defendant's actions violated his procedural due process rights. 2 The court
concluded that the right to have a hearing on the issue of the state's temporary
custody before seven days after removal of the child was not a clearly
established due process right even though the right to have a hearing within two
days was established by state law.83 The court reasoned that the state law did
not create an interest that must be protected by due process. t Moreover, there
was no case interpreting federal due process law to require that a hearing in a
temporary custody case be granted within seven days. 5
The Campbell case further illustrates the range of possibilities open to a
court determining whether a law was clearly established. In Campbell, rather
than extrapolating from the general requirements of due process which are
implicated when a child is removed from its home, the court looked for a
precise fit and distinguished law contrary to its conclusion. Using the same
materials-the requirements of state law and the general mandates of due
process-the court could have found quite plausibly that clearly established law
was violated.
In some areas of constitutional rights, the courts have come close to saying
that law could never be clearly established. In Lynch v. City ofBoston, the court
addressed the question of whether certain First Amendment rights, which are
determined by a balancing of factors, could ever be clearly established for
79.
80.
81.
82.

141 F.3d 927, 929-30 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 928.
Id.
Id. at 929.

83. Id. Similarly, in Spencer v. Lavoie, 986 F. Supp. 717, 721 (N.D.N.Y. 1997),
the court granted qualified immunity to a caseworker who had removed children from
their parents' custody regardless of whether the defendant's actions violated state law.
84. While the state law that mandated a hearing within two days did not create a
constitutional interest in such a hearing, the court explained that a state law allowing
prisoners to have access to telephones did create such a right. Campbell v. Burt, 141
F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1998).
85. Id. at 929. The court reached this conclusion despite citing a court of appeals
decision which confirmed that due process required prompt post-deprivation process after
the emergency removal of a child from its home. Id. (citing Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d
333, 334 (4th Cir. 1994)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/9
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purposes of qualified immunity. 6 There, the plaintiff, an independent
contractor for the City of Boston, claimed that her First Amendment rights were
violated when her contract was not renewed based on the exercise of her free
speech rights.87 In order to determine whether the plaintiffs First Amendment
rights were violated in this context, a three-part balancing test was applied.88
The court stated that, because an official could never know with certainty the
outcome of a balancing test, many courts had determined that "when a
balancing test is to be applied, the right is not clearly established. ''89 This
conclusion is based on the premise that "where a balancing test is required,
reasonable public officials cannot be expected to know what the outcome of
application of the test will be, and therefore cannot be expected to know that
what is being done will be a violation of a 'clearly established' right. '90 This
raises the prospect that whenever the underlying constitutional right is
determined by a balancing test, as many are, 91 the court could take the position
that there can be no civil rights claim that would not be defeated by the qualified
immunity defense.
Finally, if the law is clearly established, the court applying the qualified
immunity defense again gets the opportunity to apply a standard by determining
if a reasonable official would have known that he was violating this clearly
established right.92 Here, if the right itself is sufficiently broadly stated, courts
86. 989 F. Supp. 275, 288 (D. Mass. 1997). But see, e.g., Metro Display Adver.
v. City of Victorville, 143 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 1998) (denying qualified immunity where

claim is based on First Amendment).
87. Lynch, 989 F. Supp. at 287.

88. Id. at 287.
89. Id. at 288.
90. Id.
91. See Sullivan, supranote 54, at 61.
92. See, e.g., Gravely v. Madden, 142 F.3d 345, 346 (6th Cir. 1998) (granting
qualified immunity to prison official where reasonable official would not have known
that fatally shooting an escaped inmate in an effort to apprehend him would be a
violation of the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights); Marietta v. Macomb County
Enforcement Team, 141 F.3d 270, 275 (6th Cir. 1998) (extending qualified immunity to
prosecutor against claim that he violated plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right to be free
from arrest without probable cause as a reasonable prosecutor would not have known that
arrestee's conduct did not constitute extortion); DeCarlo v. Fry, 141 F.3d. 56, 63 (2d Cir.
1998) (conferring qualified immunity on social service agency employees who
reasonably relied on their supervisor's instructions in processing a day care license
application); Jackson v. Everett, 140 F.3d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1998) (granting qualified
immunity to prison official because a reasonable prison official would not have known
that additional security measures were necessary, under the Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference standard, in order to prevent the stabbing of an inmate by his
cellmate); Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1997) (granting qualified immunity
to police officer who arrested plaintiff without probable cause in violation of the Fourth
Amendment because a reasonable officer would have arrested plaintiff given wife's
complaint of abuse and state law requiring an arrest in domestic violence situations);
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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Danahy v. Buscaglia, 134 F.3d 1185, 1193 (2d Cir. 1998) (allowing qualified immunity
where reasonable officials could have concluded that plaintiffs were within the policy
maker exemption of the First Amendment right to association and therefore could be
terminated from their state employment); Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State
Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 102 (2d Cir. 1998) (granting qualified immunity where a
reasonable official could have concluded that denying brewery's application to use the
image of a frog giving a well known insulting gesture would not violate the brewery's
First Amendment rights); Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1998)
(extending qualified immunity to police officers against claim that they violated
plaintiffs' due process and Fourth Amendment rights by entering their home without
warrant and using excessive force to subdue plaintiffs involved in a domestic dispute
because a reasonable officer would have acted similarly faced with similar
circumstances); Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1997) (granting qualified
immunity to prison guards who subjected prison visitor to a strip search allegedly in
violation of the Fourth Amendment where reasonable officials would have complied with
a facially valid policy requiring such action); Vargas-Badillo v. Diaz-Torres, 114 F.3d
3, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) (granting qualified immunity to police officer because warrantless
arrest was objectively reasonable); Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 112 F.3d 19, 22 (1st
Cir. 1997) (extending qualified immunity to police officers because it was objectively
reasonable for the police to enter the parent's home and arrest the con without an arrest
warrant); Frane v. Kijowski, 992 F. Supp 985, 991 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (allowing qualified
immunity for police officers who shot plaintiff as their action was objectively reasonable
given that the plaintiff was holding a gun to his wife's head even though the gun later
turned out to be a dart gun); Ivester v. Lee, 991 F. Supp. 1113, 1126 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(granting qualified immunity to officers in claim that they gave false evidence to obtain

search warrant and thus made false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment where
reasonable officers could conclude that warrant was facially valid); Bessman v. Powell,
991 F. Supp. 830, 839 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (granting qualified immunity as a reasonable
official would not realize that changing professor's conclusions in a quality assurance
report would violate the professor's First Amendment rights); Rappa v. Hollins, 991 F.
Supp. 367,382 (D. Del. 1997) (extending qualified immunity to county council members
as a reasonable official could not have known that defamatory remarks in response to
prospective candidate's speech would have violated the candidate's First Amendment
rights); Riggs v. City of Pearland, 177 F.R.D. 395, 405 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (allowing
qualified immunity for police officer and EMS worker in claim that they violated
plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights where actions of officials in subduing plaintiff were
objectively reasonable); Schwimmer v. Kaladjian, 988 F. Supp. 631, 641 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (granting qualified immunity to official who removed child from parents' home
and administered physical exam without parental consent as a reasonable official would
not realize this violated parents procedural due process rights); Anonymous v. Kaye, 987
F. Supp. 131, 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (granting qualified immunity to board of law
examiners as it was objectively reasonable for them to conclude that denying plaintiff and
opportunity to take bar exam would not violate applicant's constitutional right of due
process and equal protection); Spencer v. Lavoie, 986 F. Supp. 717, 722-23 (N.D.N.Y.
1997) (granting qualified immunity to social services agency care worker who removed
children from mother's control without her consent because a reasonable officials could
have concluded that action was warranted by allegations of abuse); Gomez v. Pellicone,
986 F. Supp. 220, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (granting qualified immunity to school officials
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often determine that it is not reasonable that the government actor would know
that the exact factual scenario presented would violate that law. The
reasonableness question is closely linked to the clearly established question, but
nonetheless has been treated as a separate inquiry which must be satisfied even
if the right that was allegedly violated was clearly established.93 The court must
look at the circumstances surrounding the incident to determine whether the
defendant acted reasonably and is thus entitled to qualified immunity. "A
public official must not simply violate plaintiff's rights; rather the violation of
plaintiff's rights must be so clear that no reasonable public official could have
believed that his actions did not violate plaintiff's rights."94
This reasonableness inquiry can be a complicated one because it involves
the imposition of the reasonableness standard on a variety of constitutional
rights, some of which contain a reasonableness element of their own, or as in the
case of the Eighth Amendment, contain a contrasting intent requirement such
as a reckless disregard. 95 The question of whether the defendant's belief that he
was not violating a constitutional right was reasonable can thus become quite
entangled with the question of whether the underlying constitutional right was
violated. As with the first two prongs of the qualified immunity standard, the
court's consideration of the reasonableness prong provides ample opportunity
for wide discretion in the imposition of this element of the defense.
The latitude provided to the court by the reasonableness standard is
especially clear in the application of the defense to Fourth Amendment claims.
In Manetta v. Macomb County Enforcement Team, for example, the court
reviewed the denial of the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity where the underlying constitutional claim was a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.96 There, the court determined that the prosecutor's
participation in the investigation and arrest of the plaintiffs on charges of
extortion entitled him to qualified immunity because the defendant "reasonably
could have believed that probable cause existed to justify his actions."97 To
arrive at this conclusion, the court reviewed the facts known to the defendant at

where reasonable official would not know that following established disciplinary
procedures was a violation of equal protection).
93. See, e.g., Spencer, 986 F. Supp. at 721 ("Qualified immunity also will protect
a defendant, even where the right was clearly established, if the undisputed facts show
that it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe the acts did not violate that
right.").
94. Gomez, 986 F. Supp. at 226. See also, e.g., Manetta, 141 F.3d at 275; Jackson,
140 F.3d at 1151; Danahy,134F.3d at 1190; Riggs, 177 F.R.D. at 404; Schwimmer, 988
F. Supp. at 639-40.
95. See, e.g., Manetta, 141 F.3d at 275-76 (applying qualified immunity to Fourth
Amendment claim); Jackson, 140 F.3d at 1152 (applying qualified immunity to Eighth
Amendment claim).
96. 141 F.3d 270 (6th Cir. 1998).
97. Id. at 275.
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the time of his participation in the events and concluded that, given those facts,
his actions were reasonable.98 Because the standard for a violation of the Fourth
Amendment is based on whether the government official's actions were
reasonable, what the court did, in effect, was apply the underlying Fourth
Amendment standard to the qualified immunity question. So while the court
concludes that the plaintiffs "[do] state a constitutional claim in alleging that
their arrest ... violated their Fourth Amendment rights," the defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity "because, under the facts of this case and the law
in existence at the time [the defendant] acted, a reasonable official could have
believed that... [the plaintiffs] had committed extortion." 99 Because of the
confluence of the two reasonableness standards, the result of the application of
the qualified immunity standard appears to be indistinguishable from a decision
on the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim. However, since two levels of
reasonableness are being imposed, the behavior of the defendant necessary to
receive qualified immunity must be different from that required to defeat a
Fourth Amendment claim on the merits. The court then has the task of applying
this conceptually difficult "reasonableness squared" standard to the behavior of
the defendant.
When the underlying constitutional standard is not reasonableness, the task
before the court is somewhat different. In Jackson v. Everett, the court stated
that a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment requires that the government officer act with "deliberate
indifference" to the need to protect an inmate from violence.' ° When applying
qualified immunity to an Eighth Amendment claim, therefore, the court
maintained that the question is not whether the defendant acted reasonably, but
rather whether he acted with reckless disregard of the safety of the prisoner.'
The application of a reasonableness standard should only be used when
negligence is the underlying intent requirement. Here, since the required intent
is higher than that required by negligence, the qualified immunity test is adapted
to conform with the Eighth Amendment's deliberate indifference requirement."°
The court thus modified the threshold for application ofthe qualified immunity
standard, making it easier to reach because of the high standard required by the
underlying constitutional claim.

98. Id. at 277.
99. Id. at 276. The court goes on to disapprove of the district court's application
of case law that was decided after the incident in question to determine whether the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. The court maintained that this
application was incorrect because the defendants' actions should be evaluated based on
the law that existed at the time of the alleged violation. Id. This discussion leaves open
the possibility that the court if deciding the issue based on current law may have come
to a different conclusion on the qualified immunity issue.
100. 140 F.3d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir. 1998).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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In another take on the same problem, the court in Gravely v. Madden
applied the qualified immunity standard to an Eighth Amendment claim based
on the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing inmate.'0 3 The
court stated that the underlying constitutional standard in this situation is
"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm."'" As in Everett, the court was applying the reasonableness standard to
an underlying substantive claim that required more than unreasonableness to
establish a violation. Nevertheless, in Madden, the court found no conflict
between the requirements of the Eighth Amendment and the qualified immunity
defense and addressed the question of whether "a reasonable officer in [the
defendant's] position [would] have deemed it permissible to use deadly force
under the circumstances."' 05 The two circuit courts of appeals thus took
different stances towards the meaning of reasonableness when applied to a
higher intent substantive claim, one feeling the need to modify the requirement
of reasonableness, the other gamely applying the reasonableness standard to a
claim requiring malicious or sadistic intent.
As this brief survey of current case law concerning qualified immunity
indicates, the qualified immunity standard provides a multi-tiered analysis
requiring the court to make several determinations which are largely untethered
from any controlling precedent. In deciding whether the law in question was
clearly established, the court can take a narrow view requiring a factually on
point controlling precedent, or it can take a general view of what the
constitutional right in question requires. In determining whether the defendant's
actions were reasonable, the court may be guided by underlying substantive
standards, or if the underlying standard does not contain the element of
reasonableness, may hazard a guess as to what standard to apply. While all
legal directives, both rules and standards, provide room for different approaches
and results by different decisionmakers, the qualified immunity standard
provides exceptionally loose parameters within which a court may frame its
decision.
2. Qualified Immunity Denied
It is revealing to look at what is happening in cases in which qualified
immunity is denied.0 6 While the methodology is the same as that in cases in
which qualified immunity is granted, in that the court determines that a clearly
established right has been violated and then concludes that a reasonable official
103. 142 F.3d 345, 348 (6th Cir. 1998).
104. Id. at 349 (citations omitted).
105. Id.
106. Of the cases reviewed, qualified immunity was denied in approximately 20%
of the cases. I have excluded those cases where the court denied summary judgment on
the issue of qualified immunity because of disputed issues of fact.
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would have known the right was being violated, what is different is the type of
underlying constitutional right asserted in cases where qualified immunity is

denied. Whether qualified immunity is granted or denied appears to be linked
to the type of underlying civil right that is claimed to be violated. The assertion
of some types of civil rights are more likely to result in the denial of qualified
immunity. The assertion of other civil rights, especially if the alleged violation
takes place in a confrontation with law enforcement officials, will rarely result
in the denial of qualified immunity. This pattern suggests that the results of the
application of the qualified immunity defense are not haphazard. Certain types
of constitutionalwrongs are more likely to survive the rigors of the application
of the defense than others.
Certain generalizations can be made about the type of government actions
that will likely result in a denial of qualified immunity. Claims involving the
denial of due process or the violation of First Amendment rights are likely to be
well represented in the group of claims that survive a motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity." 7 Another type of case that appears
frequently in the group in which qualified immunity is denied is an attack on the
established policies or procedures of a governmental institution such as a prison
or police department." 8 In those cases, the constitutionality of large institutional
policies are challenged through the device of a suit against individual employees
who implement the policy.0 9
What is largely absent when qualified immunity is denied are situations
that involve direct confrontations between government officials and the public
in exigent circumstances. Fewer denials of qualified immunity occur when
violations of the Fourth Amendment are alleged. Even when qualified
immunity is denied in cases that do involve police behavior, it is in a setting that
is less volatile than the typical excess force or unlawful seizure claim. In
Norwood v. Bain, for example, the plaintiff claimed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment based on a police decision to search those entering a motorcycle
rally."0 This alleged Fourth Amendment violation involved the deliberate and

107. See Metro Display Adver., Inc. v. City of Victorville, 143 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir.
1998); Licldss v. Drexler, 141 F.3d 1220 (7th Cir. 1998); Catanzaro v. Weiden, 140 F.3d
91 (2d Cir. 1998); Roldan-Plumey v. Cerezo-Suarez, 115 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1997);
Mathews v. High Island Ind. Sch. Dist., 991 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Avellino v.
Herron, 991 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Malik v. Arapahoe County Dept. of Soc.
Servs., 987 F. Supp. 868 (D. Colo. 1997).
108. See LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1998); Farmer v. Hawk, 991
F. Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1998); Cunningham v. Gates, 989 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1997);
Rouse v. Plantier, 987 F. Supp. 302 (D.N.L 1997).
109. In some circumstances the plaintiff may be able to sue a government entity
directly for violations of constitutional rights. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). This option, however, is not available with respect to federal
agencies.
110. 143 F.3d 843, 845 (4th Cir. 1998).
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calm implementation of a policy concerning crime control at a rally. There was
no split second thinking involved. Similarly, in Davis v. Brady, where the claim
was based on substantive due process, the police actions in question took place
in an atmosphere of deliberation and calm, not in response to any threatened
serious crime or violence."'
While this review of cases represents too small a sample to make any
definite conclusions, the types of cases where qualified immunity is denied
suggest that categorical decisions based on the underlying substantive claim are
being made. Furthermore, these decisions determine which claims will result
in compensation for a plaintiff and which will not. It appears that government
actors will be given more latitude when they are taking actions in potentially
dangerous situations. Less discretion will be given to the government employer
who imposes unfair procedures or makes unlawful decisions. These may well
be sensible lines to draw in determining which civil rights violations justify the
imposition of a civil remedy and which must go uncompensated. What is
apparent, however, is that whether a claim will go forward depends very little
on the strictures imposed by the qualified immunity defense. Judges are being

asked, in effect, to do what they think is right with very little clear cut guidance.
While making the decision about what would be just, judges must dress up their
conclusions in the complicated costume of qualified immunity. Because they
appear clothed in the qualified immunity doctrine, the policy choices being
made about the underlying constitutional rights are hidden.
3. Impact of the Standard
Qualified immunity is clearly a standard.! 2 The test the courts must apply
in determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity is whether
the defendant violated a clearly established right of which a reasonable person
would have known. This test provides for fact-based assessment of
circumstances surrounding the alleged violation of constitutional rights. First,
an inquiry must be made into whether, with respect to the particular situation
confronted by the defendant,the right allegedly violated was clearly established.
Then the court can look to the facts surrounding the actions of the government
employee to determine whether a reasonable person in his position would have
known of this right. This analysis provides a wide range of discretion and
flexibility on the part of the judge.

111. 143 F.3d 1021, 1023 (6th Cir. 1998). In Brady, the police officers, after
arresting the plaintiff for intoxication and disorderly conduct, drove the plaintiff out of
town and left him on the side of a high speed limit road. Id. The plaintiff was

subsequently hit by a car and suffered serious injuries. Id.
112. Chen, supra note 57, at 263, 291.
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Decisions articulating the application of qualified immunity necessarily
will be tied to the particular facts of the case. No binding statements about the
contours of qualified immunity will be articulated. The case, instead, will be
decided on the specific facts of the encounter between the citizen and the
government official."' Thus, a decision will state that this particular officer is
entitled to qualified immunity, not that qualified immunity will or will not be
available with respect to certain claims. By couching decisions in qualified
immunity terms, it is more difficult to accurately track the expansion or
retraction of the remedy available for violation of a constitutional right. The use
of the standard form thus hides the doctrinal reality of civil rights litigation." 4
The fact that the qualified immunity standard hides the ball, that is, hides
the fact that certain rights have been curtailed and that others are more likely to
be vindicated, is not just an unfortunate side effect of the defense)1s Rather,
this ability to obfuscate provides a basic element of its appeal as a doctrine. The
formulation of qualified immunity as a multi-tiered standard is the form which
allows for the perpetuation of the illusion of an even-handed application of the
defense to all civil rights claims.
IV. THE COST OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Qualified immunity has not been universally admired. A large body of
literature critiques the defense and calls for its modification, elimination, or
expansion. While these critiques serve to illuminate some fundamental problems
with the qualified immunity doctrine, they do not address the central problem
with qualified immunity-its camouflaging effect. By camouflaging effect, I
mean the ability of qualified immunity to make the underlying pattern of civil.
rights doctrine undiscernible. The existing critical focus on the strengths and
weaknesses of qualified immunity fails to uncover the underlying patterns in the
availability of Section 1983 remedies.

113. Professor Chen has suggested that one danger of qualified immunity is that
it "masks the courts' decisions behind policy choices irrelevant to, or at least removed
from, the substantive constitutional policy concerns." Chen, supra note 57, at 316.
Professor Chen goes on to argue that the use of the qualified immunity standard in
conjunction with a substantive constitutional law standard distorts the meaning and
application of the constitutional law standard. See Chen, supra note 57, at 324.
114. See Chen, supranote 57, at 316.
115. For a discussion of the usefulness of baseball metaphors, such as "hiding the
ball," in legal discourse, see Michael J. Yelnosky, If You Write It, (S)he Will Come:
JudicialOpinions,Metaphors,Baseball,and "The Sex Stuff," 28 CoNN. L. REV. 813, 813
n.1 (1996). As Professor Yelnosky explains, hiding the ball "is a trick play in which an
infielder pretends to give the ball to the pitcher, but in fact keeps the ball. When the
runner takes a lead off a base, the infielder tags the runner out. It is one of the oldest
tricks in baseball." Id. at 813 n.1.
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A. Current Critiques
There are vociferous critics of the qualified immunity doctrine who attack
the doctrine as a whole. This commentary suggests that the problem with the
qualified immunity doctrine is that it is applied to the wrong group of
defendants or that it should be eliminated entirely. Those who believe that it
should be eliminated entirely generally seek to substitute governmental liability
for that of individual government officials. 6 Others believe that the problem
is not with the defense but that its application
should be available only to a
7
certain small group of government officials."
The bulk of the criticism of qualified immunity looks closely at the
structure of the defense and argues that it is internally contradictory or should
be modified to provide better results. This criticism breaks into two main areas:
the problems inherent in the "reasonableness" element". of the qualified
immunity defense and the difficulties that result from the attempt to define
"clearly established""' 9 law.
The complaints concerning the "reasonableness" element note that while
the objective reasonableness element is designed to protect the defendant from
20
protracted litigation, the defense does not really quickly resolve a lawsuit.

116. In his call for reform of the current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment,
Professor Akhil Amar proposes that immunity for individual government employees be
eliminated, stating that such immunity would have been found "a shocking violation of
first principles" by the framers of the Constitution. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment FirstPrinciples,107HARV.L. REV. 757, 812 (1994). He goes on to suggest
that governmental entities be directly liable for violation of the Fourth Amendment
rights. Id. See generally SCHUCK, supra note 6, at 182-98.
117. See Evan J. Mandarey, QualifiedImmunity orAbsolute Immunity? The Moral
HazardsofExtendingQual/ifedImmunity to Lower-Level Public Officials, 17 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 479, 513-15 (1994). Professor Mandarey proposes that only high level

employees receive qualified immunity and that low level employees should be subject

to strict liability. Id. at 513-15. See John D. Kirby, Note, Qualified Immunity ForCivil
Rights Violations:Refining the Standard,75 CORNELL L. REv. 462,479 (1990); see also
Shapiro, supra note 47, at 270-74; Janell M. Byrd, Comment, Rejecting Absolute
Immunity for Federal Officials, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1707, 1727 (1983) (arguing that

government employees should not receive immunity for malicious or reckless acts).
118. The reasonableness element establishes that the defendant's actual knowledge
of the lawfulness of his action is irrelevant and that the question is whether a reasonable
official would have known that his actions violated a clearly established constitutional
law.
119. The clearly established element of qualified immunity requires that the law
allegedly violated by the defendant was clearly established at the time the actions in
question took place.
120. Qualified immunity "stands as a legal principle defined primarily by the

Court's own policyjudgment that an individual's right to compensation for constitutional
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The fact issues raised by the reasonableness element of the defense require a
fact-finding hearing which makes it difficult to end lawsuits prior to trial.' 2 ' In
a contradictory approach, the objectively reasonable element also has been
described as being essentially a bar to judgment for the plaintiff in a civil rights
action. Because qualified immunity is designed to protect defendants notjust
from liability, but from participation in litigation, some argue that qualified

violations and the deterrence of unconstitutional conduct should be subordinated to the
governmental interest in effective and vigorous execution of governmental policies and
programs." Rudovsky, supranote 39, at 36. However, the effectiveness of this benefit
seems to be in doubt. SeeWilliam P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort
Liability of Government and Its Employeesfor Torts and ConstitutionalTorts, 9 ADMIN.
L. J. AM. U. 1105, 1143 (1996). Professor Kratzke maintains that governmental liability
should be substituted for individual liability, using the respondeat superior model from
private tort law. Id. at 1152, 1164. He concludes that while it is almost impossible for
a plaintiff to succeed in a Section 1983 suit, the lawsuit also needlessly harasses the
governmental official. Id. at 1150. This harassment seems especially wasteful when
there is little benefit to plaintiffs from the system. "Since the 1980s, it has become very
difficult for plaintiffs... to win a Bivens case. The lawsuit itself, on the other hand, can
annoy, harass, or even terrorize defendants to the point that they are afraid of effectively
performing their duties." Id. at 1143.
121. Despite the stated intentions of the Court in Harlow,where it eliminated the
subjective component of the qualified immunity defense, there are often fact issues that
must be resolved before a ruling can be made on the application of the defense. David
J. Ignall, Making Sense of QualifiedImmunity: Summary Judgment and Issuesfor the
Trier ofFact, 30 CAL.W.L. REv. 201 (1994). For example, there could be a dispute as
to the underlying facts or the intention of the defendant, which prevent a determination
ofwhether a clearly established right was violated thus requiring the case go to trial. See
Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of QualifiedImmunity: Summary Judgement and the Role
of Facts In Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 6 (1997). Professor Chen
argues that because the application of the qualified immunity defense inherently involves
fact questions, it is difficult to resolve on summary judgment. Id. at 81-88. He suggests
that the Court had set up an internally contradictory standard when it suggests that
qualified immunity issues should be resolved quickly before trial and then defines the
standard as a "reasonable" one the application of which will inevitably necessitate the
resolution of factual issues. Id. at 96-99. The contradictory nature of the qualified
immunity defense had caused lower courts to distort the summary judgment process in
order to attempt to resolve the defense issue prior to trial. Professor Ignall proposes, as
a solution to the lack of protection provided by the defense, a heightened burden of
establishing a disputed issue of fact for the plaintiff:
[T]he plaintiff should have to produce evidence that, ifuncontroverted, would
support judgment as a matter of law as the law existed at the time of the
alleged violation. If the plaintiffs evidence would be sufficient simply to
create a question for the trier of fact as to the merits, the defendant should be
entitled to summary judgment because reasonable minds could differ as to the
legality of the defendant's conduct.
Ignall, supra, at 215-16.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/9
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immunity has become essentially indistinguishable from absolute immunity. '22
The objectively reasonable standard is also seen as a mechanism for the
distortion of constitutional law. The focus on the question of what a reasonable
official would have understood the law to require leads to a "redefining of the

substantive constitutional law" in a way that gives little clear guidance as to
what the constitution requires and thus provides little guidance for future

actions.'23 Commentators similarly claim that the impact of the clearly
established element of the qualified immunity defense is inefficient, distorts the
law, and is too difficult a standard for plaintiffs to overcome. It is inefficient
and distorting because courts spend their time reconstructing what the law was
124
in the past rather than setting forth clear guidance as to what the law requires.

122. See Alfredo Garcia, The Scope ofPoliceImmunity From Civil Suit Under Title
42 Section 1983 And Bivens: A Realistic Appraisal, 11 WHITrIER L. REV. 511, 534
(1989). "[T]he individual citizen who seeks redress for a constitutional violation faces
a formidable obstacle. That obstacle is the doctrine of qualified immunity for police
officers as it had been developed by the United States Supreme Court." Id. See also
Jonathan M. Freiman, The Problem of Qualified Immunity: How Conflating
Microeconomics and Law Subverts the Constitution, 34 IDAHO L. REv. 61, 68 (1997).
Freiman asserts that "only plaintiffs bringing suit against the most egregious flouters of
the Constitution have any possibility of surviving a motion for summary judgment....
[Q]ualifled immunity has pulled the door to the courthouse nearly shut, leaving a crack
so thin that only the most battered plaintiffs can still squeeze through." Id. This
limitation on claims against individuals is particularly troubling because it has not been
accompanied by an expansion of governmental liability. See Laura Oren, Immunity and
Accountability in Civil Rights Legislation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. PiTr. L. REv. 935,
939 (1989).
123. Rudovsky, supra note 39, at 27. For example, in analyzing a Fourth
Amendment claim, which contains a reasonableness standard within its substantive
requirements, the qualified immunity question will be: Was it reasonable for a
government official to believe that his action was reasonable? This double
reasonableness analysis is confusing, and perhaps distorting, to apply. It obscures the
requirements of Fourth Amendment law and thus provides little guidance for government
officials seeking to conform to constitutional requirements. See Jon 0. Newman, Suing
the Lawbreakers: Proposalsto Strengthen the Section 1983 DamageRemedy for Law
Enforcers'Misconduct,87 YALE L.J. 447,460-61 (1978); Rudovsky, supra note 39, at
52-53.
124. The primary criticism of the clearly established standard is that it is
inefficient. Courts' time would be better spent explicating the contours of the underlying

constitutional right rather than focusing on whether the law was clearly established at the
time the acts complained of in the lawsuit took place. See Mandery, supra note 117, at
505; Heather Meeker, "Clearly Established" Law In QualifiedImmunity Analysis For
Civil Rights Actions In the Tenth Circuit,35 WASHBURN L. J. 79, 84 (1995); Oren, supra
note 122, at 1007; Shapiro, supra note 47 at 264-65. Oren writes:
When we talk about immunity doctrine, we are not talking about the merits
of the constitutional claim. Rather, the defense obtains even if a wrong has
been done. Perhaps we should be addressing the underlying claim instead of
deflecting an apparent hostility to some kinds of lawsuits onto official
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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The qualified immunity defense has also been assailed because of its
requirement that a constitutional right must be clearly established before any
liability can attach. This is a difficult standard to overcome. 2 ' The difficulty
in identifying clear legal authority establishing the unlawfulness of a particular
26
official's act may be too difficult a task and thus exclude meritorious claims.
There is then a body of literature examining the discrepancy between what
the qualified immunity defense was meant to accomplish and how it actually
works. The defense does not protect defendants in a meaningful way. At the
same time, it makes a judgment for the plaintiff almost impossible to obtain.
Therefore, the defense seems to be serving no one's interests. These well
documented weaknesses suggest that qualified immunity's role is not to allow
for just outcomes, but to provide some other service. What is missing from
these critiques is an analysis of what function the current doctrine serves. In the
next section, I explain that while qualified immunity often results in unfairness
or inefficiency, the doctrine also provides a flexible mechanism by which
divisive issues are seemingly resolved. This mechanism, however, has a cost.
B. QualifiedImmunity as a Disquise
The problem with qualified immunity is not so much that the outcomes are
sometimes unfair but the fact that qualified immunity blocks a clear view of the
real limitations that exist in civil rights law. Civil rights law is, in effect, being
designed in the dark. Distinctions are being made about the types of cases that
will receive compensation and the types that will not. These distinctions are not
articulated as such; instead, the results are understood to be the result of the

immunity doctrine.
Oren, supranote 122, at 1007. See also Freiman, supra note 122, at 81.
The issue of the problems presented by the clearly established standard were
recently addressed in County ofSacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1714 n.5 (1998),
where the Court determined that in applying the qualified immunity defense, the trial
court should first "identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been

violated." Id. The constitutional issue should not be avoided because if not addressed
"standards of official conduct would tend to remain uncertain, to the detriment both of
officials and individuals. An immunity determination, with nothing more, provides no
clear standard, constitutional or non-constitutional." Id.
125. "If clearly established law is narrowly defined . . . it becomes nearly
impossible to overcome qualified official immunity." Oren, supranote 122, at 982.
126. There are myriad factual scenarios that could give rise to, for example, a
Fourth Amendment violation concerning an unreasonable seizure. If a plaintiff cannot
point to a controlling case in the Supreme Court, the circuit court of appeals, or the
highest court of the state declaring that a factual scenario similar to the one being
challenged is a violation of the Constitution, the law may not be considered clearly
established. Thus, the high threshold of identifying the right as "clearly established" has
been critiqued as presenting an almost insurmountable barrier to the civil rights plaintiff.
Oren, supra note 122, at 982, 992-95.
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qualified immunity defense. As we have seen, for example, a procedural
complaint in the context of an employment dispute is more likely to survive the
qualified immunity defense than is a complaint about whether a police officer
used excessive force in the arrest of a dangerous suspect. Rather than
organizing civil rights law in these categorical ways, however, qualified
immunity makes the civil rights remedial system appear to be about individual
cases and the reasonableness of individual defendants.
Current qualified immunity doctrine serves as a means to diffuse conflict.
Without a clear rule that some kinds of civil rights harms will not be redressed,
there is minimal pressure for change. This "hiding of the ball" quality of
qualified immunity is why, in spite of many expressions of dissatisfaction with
the system, there had been little effective rallying for change. The reason the

discontent of the participants in this system has not led to a significant change
is that the terms of the debate are defined by the immunity system rather than

by the fundamental question of the extent of rights and liabilities in civil rights
actions. The civil rights remedial scheme organized around qualified immunity
thus has an inherently self-preserving or stabilizing quality. It allows for
tinkering at the margins, but fundamental recasting of the terms of the debate
is unlikely.
My assertion that qualified immunity has a camouflaging effect on civil
rights law is supported by a large body of scholarship that explores legal
regimes that define reality in a way that limits the ability of the participants in
the system to change it.'27 These scholars argue that when a legal system is
accepted as being the only available way to organize an activity and thus seems
inevitable, the legal system encourages acceptance of the status quo. 2 8 The

127. See, e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment:
Transformationand Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331,
1350-51 (1988); John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies
Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminancy
Argument, 45 DuKE L. REv. 84, 95-98 (1995).

128. This school of thought is largely influenced by Antonio Gramsci and his
exploration of the concept of hegemony, that is, the idea that "that the most effective kind
of domination takes place when both the dominant and dominated classes believe that the
existing order, with perhaps marginal changes, is satisfactory, or at least represents the
most that anyone could expect, because things pretty much have to be the way they are."
Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 281,

284-86,287 (1982). See also Crenshaw, supra note 127, at 1351. Lawrence writes:
A considerable body of scholarship from the academic left has analyzed the

law as a hegemonic tool of domination. According to one theory, domination
occurs when the ruling class gains the consent of the dominated classes

through a system of ideas that reinforces the morality or inevitability of the
existing order. This "interest theory" sees ideology as a consciously wielded

weapon, an intellectual tool that a group uses to enhance its political power
by institutionalizing a particular view of reality.
Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, And Equal Protection: Reckoning With
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insights gained by scholars working in this area are helpful to apply to the
qualified immunity standard in order to explore its hold on the civil rights
imagination. This analysis maps out the way a doctrine such as qualified
immunity can develop into an obstacle to the very aims it professes to
accomplish.
Particularly apposite to an analysis of civil rights law is the work that has
been done on the change-inhibiting impact of the development of
antidiscrimination law. 129 In commenting on the effect of the adoption of equal
rights rhetoric on the struggle to end racial inequality, Kimberle Crenshaw has
concluded that "[s]ociety's adoption of the ambivalent rhetoric of equal
opportunity law ha[s] made it that much more difficult for Black people to name
their reality. While equal employment opportunity law has been adopted, the
material reality of most Black people has not improved."' 30 In fact,
improvement may be hindered by the existence of the equal opportunity law
since it may undermine the political consensus necessary for change.' 3' Another
commentator has suggested that "the language of rights undermines efforts to
change things by absorbing real demands, experiences, and concerns into a
vacuous and indeterminate discourse. The discourse abstracts real experience
and clouds the ability of those who invoke rights rhetoric to think concretely
about real confrontations and real circumstances.' 3 2 The existence of
antidiscrimination law can thus create the appearance of improvements in33 racial
equality while at the same time not encouraging fundamental change.
The focus on the intent of the actor in equal protection claims rather than
the impact on the person experiencing the discrimination has also been criticized
as an inhibitor to the elimination of racial inequality. 3 By paying exclusive

UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,326 (1987). See also Allan C. Hutchinson
& Patrick J. Monohan, Law andPolitics,and the CriticalLegalScholars: The Unfolding
DramaofAmerican Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 213-19 (1984).
129. See Crenshaw, supra note 127, at 1346-47; Alan D. Freeman,
AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 96,96-97 (1982);
Gordon, supra note 128, at 286-9 1.

130. Crenshaw, supranote 127, at 1347.
131. Crenshaw, supra note 127, at 1347.
132. Crenshaw, supra note 127, at 1347 (citing Tushnet, supra note 58, at 1382-

84).
133. Freeman states:
The present goal would seem to be to legitimize the accomplishments of civil
rights law by emphasizing and displaying a small but successful black middle

class, and by seeking to gain its allegiance while ignoring the victimperspective claims of the vast and disproportionate numbers of poor and
unemployed black people.
Freeman, supra note 129, at 113-14. See also Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
DiscriminationThrough AntidiscriminationLaw: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court
Doctrine,62 MINN. L. REV. 1016, 1102 (1978).
134. Lawrence, supra note 128, at 324-25.
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attention to the blameworthiness of the defendant, an examination of the impact
of the challenged practice on those complaining about it is lost. Fairness to the
defendant, rather than eliminating discriminatory effect, is the central concern.
These commentators suggest that the economic and social reality of race
inequality is obscured by the existence of antidiscrimination law and by the
success of a small exceptional group. As Derrick Bell has stated,
"Discrimination claims when they are dramatic enough and do not threaten
majority concerns, are given a sympathetic hearing, but there is a pervasive
sense that definite limits have been set on the weight that minority claims
receive when balanced against majority interests."' 35 While it is unclear what
the alternative to antidiscrimination law is, these critiques strongly argue that
antidiscrimination law does not do what it suggests it will do and may, in fact,
make a better system more difficult to imagine and thus to create.
This current critique of antidiscrmination law can be used to understand
how the qualified immunity standard affects the system of compensation for
constitutional wrongs. One major similarity is the way in which the existence
of Section 1983 siphons off pressure to create some other system of redress.
The open-ended language of the Section 1983 statute seems to promise a
powerful remedy against governmental abuse. As we have seen, qualified
immunity severely limits that remedy, but on a case-by-case basis. There is no
general prohibition against certain types of civil rights claims, only the
seemingly individualized application of the qualified immunity defense. The
fact that some types of claims are destined to fail because of the type of claim
they are, not because of the particularized behavior of the defendant, is hidden.
Adding to the illusion of a generally available remedy is the spectacular success
of a few high profile cases. A few large recoveries in cases that present
compelling facts obscure the reality of the fruitlessness of most
particularly
36
claims.
On the other side of the lawsuit, qualified immunity promises much more
to the defendant than it delivers. The defense is supposed to protect government
actors not only from liability but also from entanglement with litigation. The
promise is often not kept because the qualified immunity defense presents a
combination of fact and law questions that cannot be quickly disposed of prior
to trial. However, the theoretical protection offered by the defense and the low
incidence of actual judgments against government actors lulls government
employees into acquiescence to the system.
The emphasis that qualified immunity places on the reasonableness of the
defendant's actions rather than on whether a constitutional right was violated is
135. Crenshaw, supra note 127, at 1349 (citing DERRICK
§ 9.11.3, at 117 (2d ed. Supp. 1984)).

BELL, RACE, RACISM,

AND AMERICAN LAW

136. For example, last year a plaintiff was awarded $ 2 million for violation of his
substantive due process rights. Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d. 511 (7th Cir. 1998). This
case involved a dramatic scenario in which the decedent was murdered after informing
on another employee. Id. at 513.
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another way in which qualified immunity distorts civil rights law. Qualified
immunity makes the essential issue of a civil rights claim the question of
whether it would be too much of an inhibitor of government action to require
a particular defendant to pay damages to the plaintiff. The focus is not, at least
initially, on whether the plaintiffs constitutional rights were violated. This
emphasis also makes it difficult to discern and consider which rights are or
should be protected and which we are content not to protect with monetary
compensation.
Qualified immunity's harm is that it makes it difficult to see the policy
choices made by courts in civil rights actions. Cloaking these policy choices in
the qualified immunity doctrine avoids the possibility of an open debate
concerning which civil rights should be protected and how.

VI. CONCLUSION
Given its obvious flaws, the continuation of qualified immunity as the key
legal issue in civil rights cases can only be explained by the hidden purpose it
serves; it avoids the divisive and perhaps unresolvable conflicts among
participants in civil rights litigation. Qualified immunity accomplishes this
conflict-avoiding function by giving judges wide latitude in making
determinations about its application and by couching the outcomes of civil
rights litigation in terms that make the substantive results difficult to perceive.
These qualities account for the faithful adherence to a doctrine that is regarded
as so unsatisfactory to so many.
The problem with this conflict avoidance mechanism is that it allows
unarticulated decisions to be made about the extent of liability for civil rights
violations. Civil rights litigation does have limitations to it; every case is not
given an opportunity to succeed. These determinations are being made; they are
just not described as such. Using qualified immunity as a shield from the truth
may buy us peace, but it keeps from us the tools required for reform.
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